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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/03/2004

Accident number: 32

Accident time: 10:55

Accident Date: 10/05/1996

Where it occurred: Namaacha, Maputo
Province

Country: Mozambique

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Detection accident

Date of main report: 20/05/1996

ID original source: ADP-7/MC/AN/BF

Name of source: CND/IND/ADP

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: OZM-4 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: metal fragments
grass/grazing area

Date record created: 22/01/2004

Date last modified: 22/01/2004

No of victims: 3

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
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Accident report
An internal investigation dated 20th May 1996 was made available. Its content is summarised
here.
The demining platoon had been at the site since 11th March 1996. The minefield was a
defensive ring on largely flat ground with long grass and small bushes. Mines found
previously included POMZs and an OZM-4. The ground was contaminated by fragments from
mines that had gone off. The deminers were using shears and detectors. They were supplied
with "protective clothing" comprising a cotton apron, boots and industrial safety glasses.
Victim No.1 was working downhill without his detector and was two metres in front of the end
of his end-of-lane marker when the accident occurred at 10:55. He pulled a tripwire and
initiated an OZM-4 that was a metre away. He suffered traumatic amputation of his left foot.
Two other deminers were slightly injured with single fragments to the elbow and chin. The
Platoon Commander ordered a helicopter from Maputo. The platoon paramedic gave first aid.
One of the UN investigators arrived with the helicopter at 12:00. It left with Victim Nos.1 & 2 at
12:05. Victim No.3 was evacuated by road. Victim No.1 had an operation at Maputo Central
Hospital and the other two victims were released after treatment.
The investigators felt that if SOPs had been followed the accident could have been avoided.
SOPs stated that slopes must be cleared uphill [there was "ambiguity" about how the base of
a slope should be reached]. They believed that Victim No.1 was interpreting the SOP as he
thought best and walked through an uncleared area to reach the base of the slope. The usual
supervisor (subcontracted from a commercial demining company) was away, which may have
been relevant. The Section Commander said that he was happy with the methods used that
day.

Conclusion
The investigators found that Victim No.1 and his partner had cleared 25 metres in three hours
(the normal rate was 4-5 metres per hour). Fragments were found in the part of the lane they
had cleared. The lane began at a width of 1m, expanding to 1.75m. They concluded that
Victim No.1 was not using his detector at the time. They felt there was no doubt that the
principle cause was Victim No.1's negligence and also blamed a lack of supervision. Had the
usual supervisor been present the breaches of SOP would have been noticed. The section
commander failed to take responsibility for safety by failing to stop the victim working too fast.

Recommendations
The investigators made lengthy recommendations including reinforcing the need to remove all
metal and expanding the group's operational procedures.

Victim Report
Victim number: 46

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: US$1,188

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: Safety spectacles

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
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Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
An accident report (written in Portuguese) dated 15th May 1996 stated that Victim No.1 had an
amputation of the left foot and was then treated in the Special Clinic of Maputo Central
Hospital.
A medical report stated that the victim was judged to be 50% incapable of doing any work,
with a permanent physical disability of 70%. It was recommended that his suitability for other
employment should be assessed after six months.

Victim Report
Victim number: 47

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: Safety spectacles

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 48

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Face
COMMENT
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No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the main
victim was in breach of SOPs and his errors went uncorrected. The secondary cause is listed
as “Inadequate training” because it seems that the Victim did not know the risks he was
taking.
It is not clear what the victim was doing when he initiated the mine. Quite how he tripped a
tripwire on a bounding mine and lost a foot without suffered wide fragment injury is unclear. It
would make more sense if he stepped on the trigger mechanism of the fuse, or the mine were
a non-bounding type.
It is possible that the SOPs and/or training were inadequate, which would represent failings
higher in the management chain.

Related papers
The recommendation of the UN Compensation Committee was that compensation of 36% x
30 x US$110 (salary) = US$1,188 be paid to victim No.1.
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